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On the Purpose of 'Merit'
in the Theology of Thomas Aquinas
JOSEPH WAWRYKOW
I aim in this essay chiefly to provide an adequate answer
to the following question: why does Thomas Aquinas affirm the
theological notion of 'merit' ?
On the face of it, the answer to this question appears simple.
Conditioned by Reformation debates, we are apt to think that merit'
talk must be designed primarily to advance a set of claims about
the dignity and achievement of the human person. By 'meritorious'
action, a person establishes a right to spiritual reward from God; the
affirmation of merit before God would thus testify to the ability of the
person to contribute in a meaningful way to his or her own salvation.
While Aquinas throughout his career agrees that human beings do
contribute by their actions to their own salvation, in this article I
shall argue that by the time of the Summa theobgiae this aspect of
merit'talk has receded to secondary importance. Rather, the principal
focus of the mature discussion of merit lies elsewhere, in the depiction
of the God who is revealed in striking fashion through the salvation
of human beings. By the time of the Summa theologίae, the doctrine of
merit is primarily designed to allow Thomas Aquinas to speak most
appropriately about God.1
1. In an article entitled "John Calvin and Condign Merit," to appear in the
Archivfϋr Refσnmationsgeschichte (1992), I have examined in some detail the principal
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The article falls into three distinct parts. First, I will delineate
the main contours of Thomas's mature discussion of 'merit' in the
Summa, here noting the chief differences between this analysis and
that offered much earlier by Thomas in the Scriptum on the Sentences
of Peter Lombard. Then, I shall try to account for these differences,
paying particularly close attention to the developments between the
Scriptum and the Summa in Thomas's understanding of grace, as well
as in his sense of the purpose of God's creating and redeeming.
Finally, I shall make some wholly tentative observations about the
originality of the mature Thomas's treatment of merit, especially as
this pertains to my claim about the principal purpose of merit-talk in
the Summa. The careful examination of Thomas's construction of the
mature teaching on merit will concomitantly shed light on Thomas's
theological procedure, and so suggest, in turn, the general shape of a
responsible reading of his theological work.
DIFFERENCES IN
THOMAS'S DISCUSSIONS
OF MERIT
While there are numerous references in passing to 'merit'
throughout the Thomistic corpus, Thomas has provided us with exten-
sive analyses of 'merit' in only two of his works, conveniently located,
however, near the beginning and near the end of his theological
career.2 As we would expect, the treatments of merit in the early
Scriptum and in the later Summa share a number of features. In both,
human existence is viewed in terms of a 'journey' which begins in
the conversion from sin to grace, runs through the morally good and
graced actions that are pleasing to God and bring one closer to God,
objections raised by Luther and Calvin to the Catholic affirmation of merit. I have
also argued that despite his polemic against merit, Calvin in fact approximated,
especially in his analysis of sanctification, a teaching on condign merit as found in
the later Aquinas.
2. The discussion of merit in the early (1252-1256) Scriptum on the Sentences of
Peter Lombard is found in 2.27.1.3-6. I have used the edition of P. Mandonnet and
M. F. Moos (Paris: Lethielleux, 1929-1947). Thomas considers merit in the Summa
theologiae (1266-1273) in the final question of the prima secundae, 1-2.114. I have
used the version in the Leonine edition of the Opera Omnia (Rome, 1882- ).
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and, culminates, in the next life, in the beatifying vision of God. The
Scriptum and the Summa similarly agree about the principal rewards
of the actions done in grace: eternal life itself; and an increase in the
habitual grace that is required to perform acts pleasing to God.
Even more striking than the common elements, however, are the
differences that distinguish the earlier and the later accounts of merit.
The Summa's discussion of merit differs in two main ways from the
Scriptum's. The first emerges in Thomas's discussions of the possibility
of merit.3 In both the Scriptum and the Summa, Thomas demon-
strates a keen sense of the difficulties involved in affirming merit.
'Merit' means to put another in one's debt. But God cannot be a
debtor to anyone, and so human merit before God would seem to
be excluded.^ Similarly, merit presupposes an equality between what
is done and what is given as reward. But nothing that people can
do could possibly be equal to the reward of eternal life, thus again
placing merit before God in doubt.5 While the concerns about the
possibility of merit remain the same, Thomas meets these concerns
in each work in remarkably different ways. In the Scriptum, his basic
move is to determine the type of justice that pertains to merit before
God, arguing that it is not commutative justice (which would demand
a quantitative equality between our act and God's reward), but rather
distributive justice that is here in force—God renders to people who
are equally deserving the same reward for their works.6
Thomas as well has a second move in the Scriptum to establish
the possibility of the merit of eternal life, one to which he simply
refers here in passing: the promise of God.7 God has, in freedom,
committed God to render the reward of eternal life for human merit.
In this light, then, it is incorrect to speak of meritorious action placing
God in a person's debt. Rather, by the promise, God has placed God
3. In the Summa theobgiae, Thomas has devoted a separate article (1-2.114.1)
to the consideration of the possibility of meriting before God. In the Scriptum, his
comments on the possibility of merit occur in the course of his examination of the
condign meriting of eternal life {Super Sent 2.27.1.3).
4 Super Sent. 2.27.1.3 ob. 4; Summa theobgiae 1-2.114-1 ob. 3.
5. Super Sent. 2.27.1.3 ob. 2; Summa theobgiae 1-2.114.1, to which compare 1-
2.114.3 ob. 3.
6. Super Sent. 2.27.1.3 sol., to which compare ad 1 and ad 4.
7. Super Sent. 2.27.1.3 ad 4.
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in debt to God, and in rendering reward to us God is simply being
faithful to God.
In the discussion of the possibility of merit in the Summa, on the
other hand, Thomas's earlier preoccupation with the kind of justice
that is involved in merit has simply fallen away. In its place, he now
affirms a divine ordination as the ground of merit: merit before God
is possible because God has ordained that acts done in grace will be
meritorious of eternal life. By virtue of the divine ordination, the
difficulties raised in the objections lose their force. Of course there is
an infinite distance between God and people. But God's ordination
simply bridges the gap: God has ordained that what human beings do,
despite its intrinsic inferiority, will nevertheless be treated as deserving
of eternal life.8 Similarly, the divine ordination removes the 'debtor'
objection. In rewarding our action, God is being faithful to God's
freely made ordination. To the extent that there is a 'debt' here, on
the basis of the divine ordination the debt is owed by God to God.9
The divine ordination thus assumes in the Summa great signifi-
cance. By explaining the possibility of meriting, it renders feasible
the subsequent dicussion of the particular rewards of this meriting.
It is one thing, however, to detect importance; it is quite another
to assert the precise meaning of this crucial term. Now a variety of
meanings for 'ordination' have in fact been proposed in the literature
on merit;10 it will be of the utmost importance to my claim about
8. Summa theologiae 1-2.114.
9. Summa theobgiae 1-2.114.1 ad 3.
10. In general, students of Aquinas's teaching about merit have tended either to
construe the Summa's divina ordinatio too narrowly, restricting it to a single meaning,
or to underplay its significance, failing to see that it is the foundation of the distinctive
analysis of merit offered in the Summa. For examples of the former, see Otto H.
Pesch, "Die Lehre vom 'Verdienst1 als Problem fur Theologie und Verkϋndigung," in
Wahrheit und Verkϋndigung: Festgabe M. Schmaus, ed. Leo Scheffczyk et al. (Paderborn:
Ferdinand Schόningh, 1967) 2:1904, which assimilates ordinatio too closely to the
Scotist acceptation and B. Hamm, Promissio, Pactum, Ordinatio (Tubingen: J. C. B.
Mohr, 1977), pp. 312-313, 334-336, which relates the divine ordination that makes
merit possible to the inner teleology of grace. For an example of the latter error,
see W. D. Lynn, Christ's Redemptive Merit: The Nature of Us Causality According to
St. Thomas (Rome: Gregorian University, 1962). Lynn recognizes (e.g., p. 43) that
the term Ordinatio' covers a wide range of meanings, but fails to recover all of these
meanings or to accord ordinatio the prominence and centrality that it enjoys in the
mature teaching.
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the main purpose of merit^talk in the Summa to attain a greater
familiarity with this concept. Still, at this stage in the investigation,
we are simply not in position to grasp the full range of meaning of this
term as used in the first article of the question on merit in the Summa;
that must wait until later in this essay. For the moment, let it suffice to
say that at an absolute minimum the 'ordination' that grounds merit
in the Summa refers to the 'promise1 that had figured momentarily in
the related discussion in the Scriptum. We can 'merit'—that is, can
deserve a reward from God—because God has freely determined to
treat our actions done in grace as 'meritorious' of reward.
In addition to the enhanced prominence of the divine ordination,
there is a second way in which the Summa's treatment of merit differs
from that in the Scriptum. Thomas's discussion of merit in the Scriptum
is a rather straightforward account, that concentrates on the actual
objects or rewards of merit. Hence, it is concerned to demonstrate
in this distinction that by their good acts people can merit not only
the end of the spiritual life, God, but the increase of grace and even
the conversion of another person as well.11 In the Scriptum, Thomas
is not interested in telling us which features of the spiritual life, if
any, elude merit. The only possible exception in the Scriptum is his
discussion of conversion, the first entry into the state of grace: in this
distinction, Thomas appears reluctant to concede that the human
person can merit the first grace.12 However, I believe that this is
only an apparent exception to the claim that in the Scriptum Thomas
deals only with the actual objects of merit. In this writing, Thomas
affirms the facere quod in se est> according to which God grants grace
to a sinner who by his or her freely initiated and performed actions
tries to amend his or her life.13 Moreover, although he stresses that
congruent merit is an imperfect merit that falls short of merit in the
strict sense—that is, falls short of the condign merit that is governed
by justice—in this writing Thomas does admit that congruent merit
is a real merit, and in fact he discusses the facere in terms of such a
11. Thomas considers the meriting of beatitude in Super Sent. 2.21 Λ article 3, of
the first entry into the state of grace in article 4, of the increase of grace in article
5, and for another in article 6.
12. Super Sent. 2.27.1.4.
13. See, for example, Super Sent. 1.48.1.3 sol. and ad 1, 2.4.1.3 sc, 2.21 Λ A, and
2.28.1.3 ad 3.
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congruent merit.14 Thus, in his discussion of the merit of the first
grace in the present distinction, all Thomas probably wants to do is
to exclude the condign merit of first grace, while wishing us to under-
stand that the sinner nevertheless does merit this grace congruently.15
The situation is rather different in the Summa. Thomas naturally
enumerates in 1-2.114 the rewards that do fall under merit, and again
tells us that people can merit the end of the spiritual life, as well as
the increase of habitual grace and conversion for another.16 But in the
Summa Thomas is not content just to tell us which rewards Christians
can merit by their acts. He also devotes considerable attention to
telling us which aspects of the spiritual life cannot be merited through
good action. Thus, for example, whatever hesitations he might have
had on this question in the Scriptum, Thomas unequivocally rejects
in Summa theologίae 1-2.114.5 any merit of the first grace. In keeping
with his affirmation of gratuitous election to salvation, in this article
Thomas stresses that conversion itself is worked freely by God alone,
apart from any kind of merit of the sinner. Similarly, in the ninth
article, Thomas argues for an unmerited grace of perseverance.
Thomas's attitude toward perseverance in the earlier Scrίptum is dif-
ficult to document, precisely because he hardly discusses the question.
However, it is most likely that his position in the earlier work is that
the one who perseveres on the path to God is the one who acts freely
in accordance with the inclination of the habitual grace received in
justification; perseverance in grace is left, as it were, in the hands of
the justified. In the Summa, on the other hand, perseverance is a free
gift of God by which God applies a person to good action and keeps
the person away from sin. The result of Thomas's inclusion of these
unmerited graces of conversion and perseverance in his description
14- In Super Sent. 4.15.1.3, Thomas recalls the view that the disposition for grace is
sometimes said to be congruently meritorious of that grace, but he adds that congruent
merit is not really or properly 'merit'. In other texts (2.27.1.4 ad 4, 2.27.1.6), he
reports that some theologians explicitly link the facere to congruent merit. Thomas
does not indicate any disapproval of such a claim.
15. For the claim that Aquinas did in fact teach a congruent merit of the first
grace in the Scriptum, see J. Riviere, "S. Thomas et le merite 'de congruo'," Revue des
sciences religίeuses 7 (1927): 641-649.
16. Thomas treats the meriting of eternal life for those who possess grace in
Summa theologiae 1-2.114 articles 2-3, the congruent merit of first grace for another
in article 6, and the increase of habitual grace in article 8.
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of merit is a more nuanced account. Their inclusion helps us to
perceive the limits of meritorious action by bringing to our attention
those features of spiritual existence that fall outside of merit. And,
most significantly, this revision of his teaching on merit underscores
the ultimate gratuity of salvation: that one gets into grace and then
stays there is due to God's free decision to provide these graces to
the person.
REASONS FOR THE DIFFERENCES
IN THOMAS'S DISCUSSIONS
Once we have described the chief differences between
Thomas's two discussions of merit, the question naturally arises: why
has Thomas revised his teaching in these ways?
Considerable progress in accounting for these differences will be
made by recalling the immediate context of the discussions of merit.
In both works, the discussion of merit comes in the course of the
general discussion of grace. Thomas's understanding of grace had been
significantly modified between the composition of these two works.17
In the Scriptum, his teaching about grace is rather close to that of
other thirteenth-century theologians. Grace is conceived exclusively
as habitual grace; the need for grace is constituted principally by the
Όntological difference' between creatures and the God who is their
beatifying end. Relatively little consideration is given to the problem
of sin, thus making it possible to ascribe conversion and perseverance
to human initiative.
By the time of the Summa, however, Thomas advanced a markedly
different conception of grace. Greater sensitivity to the pervasive
effects of sinfulness has led the mature Thomas to look as much
at the healing, as at the elevating, function of grace.18 Thomas had
17. For orientations to the developments in Aquinas on grace, see Henri Bouillard,
Conversion et grace chez s. Thomas d'Aquin (Paris: Aubier, 1944); and Bernard J. F.
Lonergan, Grace and Freedom: Operative Grace in the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas,
ed. J. Patout Burns (New York: Herder and Herder, 1971).
18. This is apparent in the discussion of the need for grace in Summa theobgίae
1-2.109. From the second article on, Thomas is very much concerned to show the
dire effects of the fall and of sin in general. In the later articles of the question
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meanwhile discovered a second form of grace, the grace of auxilium,
to complement the earlier-affirmed habitual grace, the two forms of
grace being equally involved in the healing and elevating of the
human person. The developments in Thomas's thinking about grace
are evident in what is arguably the single most important text in the
treatise on grace, 1—2.111.2.
This passage neatly gathers up the insights of the preceding ques-
tions on grace while furthering the discussion by showing that grace
as understood by the Thomas of the Summa can be interpreted in
terms of the Augustinian categories of 'operative' and 'cooperative'.
The corpus of this article is divided into two sections. In the second,
shorter section, Thomas explains that his habitual grace can be both
'operative' and 'cooperative'.19 Operative habitual grace is responsi-
ble for 'being', taken in both a moral and a supernatural sense. By
operative habitual grace God both forgives the person's sin, and so
grants the individual a new moral stature before God, and elevates
the person to the supernatural level, orienting the person to God
as to his or her beatifying end. 'Cooperative habitual grace', on the
other hand, is responsible for 'operation'. While Thomas's meaning
is somewhat obscure, it is likely that 'operation' here refers to an
inclination or disposition to act. By cooperative habitual grace, the
person who has been made pleasing to God is now disposed to act
in the way conducive, both morally and supernaturally, to attaining
eternal life.
The discussion of auxilium in terms of the traditional Augustinian
categories in the first section of the corpus is more extensive, probably
reflecting Thomas's own greater interest in working out the implica-
tions of his discovery of this form of grace.20 Earlier in the treatise
(especially 109.8—9), Thomas insists that the tendency to sin remains active even in
the justified and must be overcome by subsequent healing graces.
19. Summa theologiae 1-2.111.2.
20. Lonergan, Grace and Freedom, chapters 4—6; see also Mark D. Jordan, "The
Transcendality of Goodness and the Human Will," in Being and Goodness: The Concept
of the Good in Metaphysics and Philosophical Theology, ed. Scott D. MacDonald (Ithaca,
N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991). Jordan highlights Aquinas's use of an extra-
Christian source, the Pseudo-Aristotelian Eudemian Ethics, in the refinement of his
ideas about the inteφlay of divine and human causality, including in the construction
of his mature teaching on grace (see pp. 138 ff., especially p. 148).
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on grace, Thomas had argued for the need of a grace of auxilium to
explain action. Habitual grace provides the capacity, the possiblity,
for morally correct and supernatural action. What is in potency to
act does not move itself, but must be applied to its action by what is
already in act. Thus, by the grace of auxilium God must realize the
potential established by habitual grace, applying the possessor of such
grace to act. 2 1 In the present article, by explaining that auxilium can
as well be understood in terms of the distinction between 'operative'
and 'cooperative', Thomas further specifies how God through auήlium
applies individuals to their action. 2 2 Thomas begins this stage of his
analysis by defining Operative' and 'cooperative' as used of auxilium.
In operative auxiUum, the will is simply passive, moved by God to its
appropriate act; in cooperative auxHiumy the will is both passive and
active, moved by God in such a way that it also moves itself. Thomas
then relates these definitions of operative and cooperative auxilia to
his treatment earlier in the prima secundae of the main stages of the
complete human act. 2 3
21. On the need for both forms of grace, see Summa theofogiae 1-2.109 in general.
For the claim that habitual grace provides the capacity (virtus) for morally correct
and supernatural action, see 1-2.109.2. Thomas argues the need for divine assistance
for human action to occur from the first article of that question. See as well 1-
2.109.2 ad 1, where, employing the passage from the Pseudo-Aristotelian Eudemian
Ethics, Thomas proposes the need for divine auxilium even in the mind healed of
sin. Thomas repeats that such auxilia are required in the life of the justified in 1-
2.109.9. Incidentally, habitual grace is first received at the end of a process initiated
by an (operative) auxilium; see 1-2.109.6 corp. and ad 3, as well as 1-2.112.2 and
1-2.111.2. The sequence of graces is therefore this: an operative auxilium that works
conversion; followed by the infusion of habitual grace, operative and cooperative, and
the subsequent granting of further auxilia, operative and cooperative, which account
for the realization of the potential provided by habitual grace.
22. Summa theologiae 1-2.111.2.
23. See Summa theologiae 1-2.6-17. At 1-2.111.2, Thomas offers a much-simplified
version of the complete human action, speaking of the 'stages' of the act in terms
of 'interior1 and 'exterior'. I have squared Thomas's present usage with the earlier
analysis of the human act. Given Thomas's example of operative auxilium in this
essay, there is no particular difficulty with equating the present 'interior' act with the
earlier-mentioned intending of the good. Similarly, the 'exterior' act of 1-2.111.2 at
the least must cover external performance. The real problem is whether the choice
of means is to be ascribed to operative or to cooperative auxilium. Is choice of means
'interior' or 'exterior'? Now, elsewhere in the Summa (e.g., 1.83.3; 1-2.13.1), choice
of means is said to be the act of the liberum arbitrium. And, later in the present article,
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Any complete human act can be divided into three main parts:
first, there is the intention or willing of a good; then, there is the
choice of the means to attaining that good; and, finally, there is the
actual performance of the act. In the present text, the willing of the
good is ascribed to operative auxilium: here, God moves the will to
the intention of a good, and the will is simply passive. The other
two parts of the human act are ascribed to cooperative auήlium. In
the choice of the means and the execution of the act, God is active,
moving the will in such a way that it also moves itself.
To a large extent, the new dimensions of the Summa's teaching
on grace provide the distinctive shape of Thomas's mature teaching
on merit. On the one hand, the insistence in question 114 about
what cannot be merited reveals Thomas's desire to be faithful to his
newly attained insights on operative auxilium. In 111.2, Thomas is
content to mention but a single instance of operative auxilium, that
of conversion. In conversion to God, God moves the will and it is
simply moved.24 There are other instances where the will intends
good as moved by God, instances covered by other operative auxilia.
Willing the good stands at the beginning of every good human action.
The good that is realized through discrete actions both approximates
the ultimate Good that is God and brings the person closer to the
ultimate Good. Subsequent to the entry into grace, which is worked
by the operative auxilium of conversion, every time a person wills
a good that is subordinate to the ultimate Good that is God, it is
similarly as moved by an operative auxilium. Operative auxilium both
initiates and sustains the journey to God in heaven, accounting for the
successful completion of the journey to God. In a word, Thomas has
complemented his teaching on the operative auήlium of conversion
with the affirmation of the operative auxilium of perseverance—and,
when speaking of cooperative habitual grace, Thomas ties liberum arbitrium closely
to cooperative grace. The meritorious act proceeds from both (see also 1-2.114.1).
Hence, in the present discussion of human activity, it is probable that choice of
means comes under the 'exterior' act that is due to cooperative auxilium: in the
choice of means, God moves us and we also move ourselves, and so merit. See also
Lonergan, Grace and Freedom, pp. 135-136.
24- The point is repeated in Summa theobgiae 1-2.112.2, where Thomas insists
that there can be no preparation for the grace of auήlium. It is simply given by God,
thus working the preparation required for the infusion of habitual grace.
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indeed, he refers to the latter auxilium explicitly in the later articles
of question 109.25 He has subsequently incorporated this teaching
on the operative graces of conversion and perseverance into the
later question on merit. Neither conversion in the first place nor
perseverance in the grace that is granted in conversion can fall under
merit; they are, Thomas repeats in the question on merit, the pure
gift of God.
The earlier questions on grace also contribute to the treatment
on merit, on the other hand, in what might be termed a 'more
constructive' manner. Read in isolation, one might suppose that their
is a rather perturbing gap in Thomas's analysis in question 114- While
Thomas talks here of the 'ordination' that makes merit possible, and
describes both what can and cannot be merited, he nowhere indicates
in the question what constitutes the action that is meritorious. In
111.2, however, Thomas has already performed this task. As Thomas
reminds us in the heading to question 114, merit is the "effect of
cooperative grace." Thus, in the earlier article Thomas has already
disclosed the locus of merit. Merit arises in the correct choice of
means and in their actual performance, both of which are facilitated
by cooperative grace.
Yet grace does not stand on its own in the Summa. Thomas's
teaching on grace in the prima secundae itself presupposes and builds
on the earlier analysis of predestination and indeed on the account
of God's purpose in creating and redeeming. That by the time of
the Summa Thomas had to link his teaching on grace explicitly
and consistently to an understanding of predestination is suggested
by the preceding. In the Scriptum, there is no particular problem in
explaining how a person gets grace in the first place. God has made
grace available to all; to get this grace, all one must do is take the
first step to God. Hence, human initiative stands at the beginning of
the journey to God and human decisions are sufficient to explain why
25. See Summa theologiae 1-2.109.9-10.1 have examined Thomas's teaching about
perseverance in greater detail—and argued for its distinctiveness in the context
of thirteenth-century theology—in "'Perseverance' in 13th-Century Theology: The
Augustinian Contribution," Augμstinian Studies 22 (1991): 125-140. I show there
how Thomas's sophisticated system of graces has allowed him to portray with greater
nuance the different ways in which God provides for the successful completion of
the journey to God.
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some come to possess grace. In the Summa, on the other hand, this
reading of the entry into grace has been excluded. Apart from grace,
apart from God's preparation for grace, all we can do is sin, which, at
least to the mind of the later Aquinas, is not a satisfying 'occasion'
for the granting of grace.
Why, then, does one person receive grace in the first place, while
others go without grace? One receives grace as the wholly unmerited
gift of God, granted by God to some in accordance with God's will.
God works conversion from sin to grace in those who have been
predestined to convert; the grace of conversion is thus the effect of
God's predestining will.26 In the light of an increased pessimism about
human beings, however, Thomas had to extend the scope of God's
predestining and so add to the graces that accomplish God's will.
The grace of conversion brings healing from sin, but healing is never
26. See in general Summa theologiae 1-2.112.2-4. In articles 2 and 3, Thomas
offers his radical reinterpretation of the familiar scholastic saying, "facientibus quod
in se est, Deus non denegat gratiam". In article 2, he asks whether a person must be
prepared for the infusion of grace. The answer is no if one is thinking of (operative)
auxilium: that is simply given by God. But if one is thinking of habitual grace, the
answer is yes. The 'matter' of the soul must be prepared for the reception of this
formal perfection. Yet, Thomas adds, preparation for habitual grace is itself worked
by God, by God's (operative) auxilium that disposes the person for the infusion of
habitual grace. In the third article of this question, Thomas asks in effect about the
connection between the two parts of the scholastic saying. Does God 'have' to give
habitual grace to one disposed for it? Thomas refers here to the two perspectives
from which preparation for grace can be viewed. As worked in the human person,
the granting of grace need not follow preparation for grace: God is not necessitated
by any creature. But, as worked in the human creature by God, the infusion of
habitual grace will in fact follow the preparation for grace: God does not act idly.
Hence, if God has worked the preparation for habitual grace by operative auxilium^
it is precisely because God has intended to infuse habitual grace in the one so
prepared. As Thomas says there, "intentio Dei deficere non potest." What God has
ordained (ordinatur) will come to pass. In 1-2.112.4, Thomas adds that one person
can have more habitual grace than another, because that person will have been more
fully prepared for habitual grace by God's auxilium. The greater preparation through
auxilium is itself due to God's greater 'care' for that person, to God's decision to grant
that person a more intense possession of habitual grace. Thomas's teaching in this
article has an even greater resonance once we recall that predestination of people
to salvation expresses God's causal love. Thomas also discusses the preparation for
habitual grace and the role of God's auήlium inspiring a person to good purpose in
1-2.109.6.
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complete in this life.27 The person who is renewed by grace remains
subject to temptation, both from within and from without, and apart
from God's free decision to maintain a person in grace—and the
execution of this decision by grace, the grace of perseverance—the
person will fall prey to temptation, that is, will sin. In this way Thomas
undergirds his mature teaching on grace by asserting a predestination
by God of some people to salvation, a predestination that accounts for
both conversion and continuance in the state of grace. One reaches
God in heaven in accordance with God's will.
Thomas's teaching about predestination, however, is not ad hoc,
as if advanced merely on account of an increased pessimism and the
enumeration of a multiplicity of graces bestowed by God. This analysis
of predestination is of a piece with Thomas's most basic convictions
about God and in particular about God's motive in creating and
redeeming. God creates in order to communicate God's goodness
outside of God. Each creature displays the divine nature by its nature,
acts, and end in the way appropriate to it. The totality of creatures
brought into being by God and sustained in their movements by
God reflects as best it can the goodness that is God.28 In creating
different kinds of creatures with their appropriate ends, God has not
acted haphazardly. Rather, the communicaton of goodness outside of
God is structured in accordance with a plan formulated in the divine
wisdom.29 In his comments about the sapiential communication of di-
vine goodness, Thomas frequently employs the language of ordination.
God has "ordained" creatures to their appropriate ends, and executes
this "ordination" in the working-out of divine providence.30 Thomas
speaks in a similar vein when he turns to the part of providence that
27. The point is repeated in Summa theobgiae 1-2.109.8- 10.
28. Thomas insists through the prima pars that God creates out of goodness and
that what God creates reflects the divine goodness. See, for example, Summa theobgiae
1.19.2.
29. See, for example, Summa theologiae 1.47.1-2; 1.44.3-4.
30. Thomas discusses providence in the Summa in 1.22. He defines providence as
the ratio of the ordo in things to their ultimate end (the divine goodness) that exists
in the divine mind (1.22.1,3). He uses the verb ordinare of divine providence in such
texts as 1.22.4 (where it pertains to providence ordinare res in finem) and 1.23.1.
Thomas draws a distinction between 'providence' and 'government'. Technically (as
at 1.22.1 ad 2), 'providence' refers to the ratio established by God and that is in
the divine mind; 'government' refers to the execution in the world of this plan. In
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is 'predestination1.31 In order to communicate the divine goodness
in a special way, God has "ordained" human beings to come into
the immediate presence of God and to share in God's own life and
activity. God executes this ordination through the gifts of grace by
which God brings the elect to their supernatural end.32
Just now, after this excursion into grace, predestination, and the
sapiential communication of divine goodness, we are finally in posi-
tion to return to the first difference noted between Thomas's early and
later treatment of merit, namely, the later insistence on the 'divine
ordination'. By his use of this term in explaining the possibility of
merit, Thomas is, as it were, rewarding the attentive reader of the
Summa. The first article of the question on merit cannot be read in
isolation from what precedes it in the Summa. The consequence of
such a disjointed reading would be the restriction of the 'ordination'
to but a single meaning, and hence to miss Thomas's point. Once we
recognize that this question is part of an integrated whole, and that it
too assumes and builds on all that has come before, it is possible to see
that the 'divine ordination' that grounds merit is rich in associations
and in fact covers a wide range of meanings.
In a first approach to 1-2.114.1, all we were able to say of the divine
ordination is that it included the promise of God to render reward for
good action done in grace. Now we can say significantly more, and in
the saying grasp the main purpose of the affirmation of merit in the
Summa. 'Ordination' is a sapiential term. Its use in the present context
brings us to the recognition that God has established the possibility
of 'merit' precisely in order to display divine goodness through us and
our salvation. What, then, does 'ordination' mean? It refers, in brief,
to all the ways in which human existence, the call of human beings
practice, however, Thomas uses the term 'providence' to cover the ratio and the
execution of the plan for creatures established in divine providence.
31. Thomas considers the relation of providence and predestination in Summa
theofogiae 1.23.1,3.
32. Thomas employs the language of'ordination' when speaking of predestination
throughout Summa theologiae 1.23. See, for example, the bodies of articles 1 and 3.
On the relation between predestination and grace, see 1.23.2 ad 4. In 1.23.3, Thomas
states that predestination includes the will to confer grace and glory, that is, both
the end of the spiritual journey (glory) and the means to that end (transformational
grace).
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to a higher destiny, and the movement of human beings to this end
through their graced actions conspire to display the goodness of God
outside of God- As voluntary agents, God has so constituted us that
by our will and movements of will we imitate the willing of God in
the way decided by God's wisdom.33 In our salvation, people display
in particular by the divine ordination the goods of both the divine
mercy and the divine justice. As predestination, the divine ordination
denotes God's loving call of people to share in God's own life.34 As
the promise that links our actions to God's reward, the ordination
provides as well the possibility for the exercise of God's justice, of
God rendering to us what we deserve for these acts.35 Finally, again as
33. Recall Summa theologiae 1-2.114-1, where Thomas relates the ordinatio that
grounds meriting to the "free choice" (liberum arbitrium) by which people move
themselves to action. In 1-2.5.7, the fact that people are to come to heaven by their
meritorious actions is expressly ascribed to the divine wisdom.
34. The teaching on predestination in Summa theofogiae 1.23 assumes that on
God's love in 1.20. In the earlier question, Thomas had differentiated God's love
from human love. In both, love' means "to will good with respect to another."
Yet our love is evoked by a good that is already present in another. God's love is
causal, creative of good (1.20.2). God's love is responsible for the variety of goods
in nature: God loves the better more in the sense that God has willed a greater
good to some (1.20.4). Hence, that they both exist indicates that God loves both
the nonrational animal and the human being. God has willed for each the good of
being. That one exists as human indicates that God loves this being more, willing to
it the greater good associated with being human. Thomas builds on this teaching on
God's causal love in the discussion of predestination (1.23.4). All humans have been
equal recipients of God's love to the extent that God's love creates them with the
same nature and capacities by which they are capable of the good natural to their
being. Yet those whom God loves more, those whom God has ordained to a greater
destiny, have received an even greater good. God's special love for them infuses in
them the grace, the effect of this love, that makes it possible to attain the special
good that is life with God in heaven (1.23.4 corp. and ad 1).
35. See Summa theologiae 1.23.5. In this article, Thomas rejects the notion that
'foreknowledge of merits' is the equivalent of 'predestination'. God does not foresee
that one will be good and so decide on that basis to reward that person with eternal
life. Rather, our spiritual good is itself the result of God's predestination. Thomas
insists that the entire salvific process—running from conversion through good works
in grace and perseverance to eternal life itself—falls under God's predestining will.
Still, he adds that one part of the salvific process—good works done in grace—is,
by the divine ordination, the meritorious occasion of another part of the process,
eternal life. Hence, by our merits, made possible by the grace granted to the elect,
one can contribute to the attainment of the end set for the person by God.
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predestination, the divine ordination furnishes the grace by which the
movement to God through our voluntary actions is in fact achieved.
Taken in its full range of meanings, the affirmation of the divine
ordination as the ground of merit in the first article thus shapes our
reading of the subsequent articles on the rewards of merit. Of course,
at one level the discussion of merit ascribes great responsiblity and
dignity to human beings. As aided by God's grace, and dependent
on the divine will, we do merit our salvation. But with his talk of
ordination Thomas has put the human achievement into its proper
context; he shifts the focus to God, to what God has done and why
God has provided for human salvation in this particular way. As
Thomas states in the second response of the first article of 1-2.114:
"What God seeks from our good works is not profit but glory, that is,
the manifestation of God's own goodness; this is what God seeks from
God's own works too. The reverence we show God is of advantage
not to God but to us. And so we merit something from God, not as
though God gained any advantage from our works, but inasmuch as
we work with a view to God's glory."36
THOMAS'S ORIGINALITY
To this point, my examination of Thomas's teaching
about merit has been confined to the Thomistic corpus. By comparing
the two principal discussions of merit, it has been possible to discern
the distinctive shape of the mature teaching on merit. Locating the
question on merit in the Summa against the background of Thomas's
thought on God's purpose in creating and redeeming, and, espe-
cially, on grace, has similarly proved beneficial. Reflection on these
related concepts helps us not only to account for the developments in
Thomas's teaching about merit but also to grasp the main purpose of
Aquinas's affirmation of merit. I wish to conclude this examination
by broadening the perspective of the inquiry, to include Thomas's
contemporaries. Unable to engage in close readings of these other
authors along the lines provided here for Thomas, my concluding
36. Summa theobgiae 1-2.114.1 ad 2. The translation is by C. Ernst, from the
Blackfriars edition of the Summa (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1964-1980),
vol. 30.
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comments must by necessity remain wholly tentative. Yet, to complete
this account of Thomas's teaching on merit, it will be worthwhile to
offer some general comments about the distinctiveness of Thomas's
approach. To what extent has Aquinas charted his own path in this
use of the theological notion of merit to proclaim God?
Aspects of Thomas's mature teaching will, of course, be repeated
in other authors. By Thomas's time, merit was a traditional topic in
theological treatises, and a general consensus existed on some key
points—for example, that by grace it is possible to merit eternal life,
and that texts about reward provide the ultimate scriptural justifica'
tion for affirming merit despite the difficulties associated with this
affirmation.37 But it would appear safe to say that in the Summa,
Thomas has offered an analysis of merit that differs from all others
in the thirteenth century. Although others will approximate discrete
features of the Thomistic analysis of merit—I am thinking here, for
example, of those who insist on the promise that grounds merit;
or, again, of the general recognition of the need for grace for full
merit—no one argues as insistently or consistently for the divine
contribution in our meriting. The subtlety with which Thomas has
approached the question of grace, detecting the need to show the
various ways in which grace comes into contact with the human
person, has facilitated the construction of what appears to be the
most sophisticated treatment of merit in the thirteenth century, a
treatment that grants to people their proper role in their salvation
while making especially clear the divine role in merit and salvation.
The question of the genesis of this teaching on grace that provides
the immediate context of the teaching on merit has proved vexing
to students of Aquinas, in particular his introduction of the grace of
auήlium and the division of it into operative and cooperative auxilia.
Some have been inclined to ascribe Thomas's new insights on grace
to a series of speculative endeavors, in which, for example, Thomas's
reflections on the different movements of will led him eventually
to distinguish more carefully between the two auxilia.^ Others have
explored Thomas's knowledge of the 'tradition', and have suggested
37. For an overview of some thirteenth-century approaches to merit, see Hamm,
Promissio, pp. 135-312.
38. Lonergan, Grace and Freedom, concentrates on Thomas's speculative endeav-
ors, casting only occasional glances at Thomas's work as an historian.
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that the changes in Thomas's ideas on grace are due to a greater
acquaintance with the tradition, or, to put it more fashionably, are
due to the expansion of his repertoire of sources.39
For my part, there does not appear to be any good reason to
make Thomas's speculative work compete with his historical research.
The one complements the other. His speculative gains on will, for
example, prepared the way for the fruitful reception of newly dis-
covered theological sources, which in turn reinforced his speculative
insights. In this light, the old thesis of Bouillard on the 'Augustinian'
contribution to the mature teaching of Aquinas on grace takes on a
new attractiveness.
As Bouillard notes, the most significant treatises of the later Au-
gustine (that is, the works that date from after 426) had been lost
to the Middle Ages after the Carolingian period. In order to account
for Thomas's changed view on conversion—in particular, his different
interpretation of the preparation for grace, so that God is responsible
for not only the infusion but also the very preparation for grace—
Bouillard suggested that Thomas in the early 1260s had rediscovered
these late Augustinian works. In reading this Augustine, Thomas
would have become sensitive to the 'Massilian' cast of his early
account of conversion, and so he would have revised the teaching
on conversion to bring it more fully in line with that of the late
Augustine.
Bouillard, of course, had been most concerned with the first entry
into grace, and so had concentrated on conversion. Yet the late Au-
gustine shows an equal fascination with the grace of perseverance.40
39. Bouillard, Conversion et grace, tends to overemphasize the role of Thomas's
historical research in the construction of the mature teaching on grace. For Bouillard's
discussion of the contribution of such late Augustinian writings as De praedestinatione
sanctorum and De dono perseverantiae to the mature Thomistic doctrine of grace, see
pp. 92ff.
40. For an excellent orientation to the main stages of Augustine's thinking about
grace, see J. Patout Burns, The Development of Augustine's Doctrine of Operative Grace
(Paris: Etudes Augustiniennes, 1980). According to Burns, Augustine had discovered
by 418 an operative grace, tied to predestination, that is responsible for conversion.
Only in the writings from 426 on (including De praedestinatione sanctorum and De
dono perseverantiae) did Augustine complete his teaching about grace by insisting
on a second operative grace, one responsible for perseverance, that is also tied to
predestination.
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Once a person has entered the state of grace, why is it that he or
she remains in grace despite the constant onslaught of temptation?
Augustine replies that God has predestined not only conversion to
grace, but perseverance in grace as well, accomplishing both by the
transforming grace that is the effect of predestination. In reshaping
his teaching on perseverance and on merits (recall what cannot be
merited, according to the later Aquinas), Thomas would thus have
learned much from Augustine.
Structurally, Thomas' and Augustine's accounts of salvation are
remarkably similar. Both ground salvation in God's free decision
to save some people, and insist that God works out this salvation
through unmerited graces, the graces that Thomas will come to call
the operative auxilia of conversion and perseverance. Verbal echoes
of the late Augustine resonate in the Summa. Although the Summa
possesses, in terms of Bouillard's original statement of his thesis,
embarrassingly little that would disclose explicitly the Augustinian
roots of the new teaching on conversion, Thomas does cite the late
Augustine on the unmerited grace of perseverance.^1 Aquinas has
learned from Augustine and made this teaching his own, although
he has also been the beneficiary of post-Augustinian reflection on
salvation, as with regard to the much fuller description of the possible
rewards of merit.
I admit that Bouillard is likely to have been mistaken when he
claimed that Thomas was the sole thirteenth-century reader of these
late Augustinian treatises. It is in fact probable that Thomas's younger
contemporary, the Franciscan Matthew of Aquasparta, read these
treatises and read them in their integrity. In Matthew's disputed
questions on grace, he quotes these late treatises at great length and
clearly has learned from this Augustine to ascribe the beginning as
well as the completion of the conversion process to God.^2 But, in
41. See Summa theobgiae 1-2.109.10 sc. and ad 3.
42. See Bouillard, Conversion et grace, p. 122, n. 126, referring to V. Doucet,
editor of Matthew's Quaestiones Disputatae de Gratia, BFSMA 11 (Florence, 1935).
For his part, Bouillard thinks that Matthew's knowledge of the late Augustine was
mediated through Aquinas; given the extent of Matthew's explicit citation of this
Augustine in the disputed questions on grace, the denial of a direct reading of
Augustine by Matthew appears unfounded. Moreover, Richard H. Rouse has furnished
evidence of the availability of Augustine's De praedestinatione sanctorum and De
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comparison to Thomas's assimilation, Matthew's comprehension of
the rediscovered Augustine has been only partial.
When it comes to the question of perseverance, Matthew's teaching
is wholly traditional, wholly in keeping with those thirteenth-century
theologians who had not been exposed to the late works of Augustine.
Why does a person persevere? Because of an unmerited gift of God?
No, Matthew tells us, perseverance is itself one of the rewards of merit.
One stays in grace because one uses correctly the grace that has been
received as a gift from God. In other words, probably because he
remained more optimistic about human moral capacity, and, at least
as is suggested by the disputed questions on grace, because he had
not, as Thomas had, seen the need to distinguish carefully among the
different movements of will, Matthew does not replicate Thomas's
insistence on the prevenience and primacy of God throughout the
salvific process. God may start the process, but it is up to the human
person to continue the process, staying in grace by good actions and
so becoming ever more worthy of God's reward.43
The claim with which I began these final observations still holds
then. Without denying a human contribution to salvation, the prin-
cipal focus of Thomas's mature teaching on merit is on God. In
the forcefulness with which he makes God the main subject of this
teaching, Thomas would seem to stand alone.
University of Notre Dame
dono perserverantiae in Paris in the last quarter of the thirteenth century. See his
transcription of a fragment of a catalogue from the Sorbonne library, which he dates
to c. 1275, in Mary A. Rouse and Richard H. Rouse, "The Early Library of the
Sorbonne," in their Authentic Witnesses: Approaches to Medieval Texts and Manuscripts
(Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1991), p. 401.
43. I have considered Matthew's teaching about grace and perseverance, and
limned its continuity with most other thirteenth-century accounts, in my "'Persever-
ance' in 13th-Century Theology."
